The amended Code 3.1 requires countries to provide the IAEA with design information for new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to build or build the facility is made. The amended Code 3.1 was introduced in the early 1990s to replace the 1976 code, which required only states to notify the IAEA of the new facilities no later than 180 days after work began. States applying the amended Code 3.1 give the IAEA additional time to respond to a state`s extension of their nuclear program and adapt protection arrangements if necessary. The IAEA`s protection measures are part of legally binding agreements. In accordance with the IAEA`s status, states accept these protection measures by concluding such agreements with the Agency. Non-NPT member states can also sign safeguard agreements with the IAEA, known as point protection agreements. India, Pakistan and Israel, for example, have placed civilian nuclear facilities under the protection of the IAEA and India has an additional protocol in place. Iraq, a state part of the NPT, has successfully circumvented the IAEA`s protection measures by using the Agency`s system to limit its inspection and monitoring activities to facilities or equipment expressly stated by each state in its guarantee agreement with the Agency. To fill the gap in “undeclared facilities,” the IAEA has launched a safety improvement plan known as the “93-2 program.” The name of the plan reflected that it was designed in 1993 with the intention of being implemented in two years. The United Kingdom has been a member of the IAEA since its inception in 1957. The signing of new bilateral agreements with the Vienna-based agency will replace existing trilateral agreements between the IAEA, Euratom and the United Kingdom.
The government statement said that the new agreements ensure that the IAEA has the right to inspect all civilian nuclear facilities and that it continues to receive up-to-date security information, ensuring that the international review of our security activities remains robust. These agreements were concluded on a voluntary basis by the five nuclear-weapon States of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The explanatory statement states that the new agreement “will enter into force after the voluntary tripartite offer agreement for and in the United Kingdom is no longer applicable. It will probably be at the end of the implementation period. The agreements are based on the basic structure of the comprehensive/comprehensive standard agreement for non-nuclear arms states, but are based on fundamentally different security obligations. It acknowledges that the NWS continues to carry out nuclear activities outside the scope of the IAEA safeguards and therefore limits the activities of the IAEA to activities identified by the NWS concerned. The IAEA safeguards do not prohibit additional bilateral or multilateral safeguards. For example, in 1991, Brazil and Argentina concluded an agreement on bilateral security inspections (ABACC) and Euratom safeguards that preceded the NPT requirement and contribute to the protection agreements negotiated by their Member States with the Agency. Security agreements ensure that all nuclear activities carried out by a state serve peaceful purposes and that a state does not carry out illegal nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the independent body responsible for enforcing security measures. As part of measures to strengthen the global protection regime, the United Kingdom has agreed with the IAEA and Euratom on an additional protocol to complement its agreement on the protection of voluntary offers. The United Kingdom`s Additional Protocol is different from that signed by nuclear-weapon-free states by providing measures to either improve the effectiveness of the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the United Kingdom or to improve the IAEA`s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear states (but not in the United Kingdom).